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Civil Resolution of Ecclesiastical Disputes
By Paul E. Salamanca
n our world of extraordinary reli-
gious plurality, schisms within
denominations occur with great fre-
quency, often bringing with them the
fascinating legal problem of who keeps
the bricks, mortar, records and savings
of the institution. The problem can arise
in virtually any denomination, from the
most hierarchical to the most congrega-
tional. Here in Kentucky, for example,
we have recently seen people in the
Episcopalian tradition coming close to
litigation after the consecration of V.
Gene Robinson, an openly gay man, as
Bishop of the Diocese of New Hamp-
shire.' On first impression, one might
think that cases arising in this area
involve only the laws of property, con-
tracts, trusts and estates, but in fact such
cases strongly implicate the First
Amendment as well.2 First, lack of
access to adequate, familiar facilities
can affect free exercise, as can the exi-
gencies of litigation itself, particularly
discovery. Second, civil courts are
understandably wary of being called
upon to construe ecclesiastical terms,
given the risk of establishment posed by
such construction. In light of these con-
cerns, a handful of somewhat
specialized approaches to resolving
ecclesiastical disputes over bricks and
mortar have developed. The purpose of
this essay is to describe three of the
most historically prominent of these
approaches, with specific reference to
prevailing rules in Kentucky.
The Doctrine of Implied Trust
Until fairly recently, one of the most
common methods of resolving such dis-
putes, at least with regard to
hierarchical denominations, was to
apply the doctrine of implied trust.
Under this doctrine, a grant of property
to a local church was deemed to be "for
the benefit of the general church
[meaning the church's hierarchy] on the
sole condition that the general church
adhere to its tenets of faith and practice
existing at the time of affiliation by the
local [church]."' This doctrine reflected
the fairly simple assumption that, when
people gather together on a local basis,
raise money, build a church, and affili-
ate themselves with a larger institution,
they do so on the implied understand-
ing that the latter will continue to
espouse the basic theological doctrine
that it holds forth at the time of affilia-
tion. Courts maintained a similar
doctrine for churches adopting a con-
gregational polity.4
Needless to say, there are flaws in
this theory. First, it depends on a sup-
position of the exact nature of the
original grantors' intent. Although
many donors may be particular about
doctrine, others may not. Others, in
fact, might wish to facilitate theological
innovation by worshipers to follow. A
second, related problem arises from
conflicting rights. That is, whose rights
should control - those of the donors,
who may be long deceased, or those of
worshipers who prefer the innovation at
issue, and who may be many in num-
ber? One might answer that a condition
attached to a gratuitous grant should be
respected out of deference to the rights
of property, but of course the doctrine
does not require the condition to be
explicit. This tension is obviously most
acute when the condition is explicit,
that is, when the original donor does
make his or her grant subject to an
express religious use.
5
But the formal demise of the doctrine
of implied trust did not in fact arise
from any of the foregoing concerns.
Instead, it arose from the anxiety
courts felt with distinguishing one the-
ological concept from another. To
illustrate, consider a grant to the hypo-
thetical "First Church of
Reincarnation," subject to a condition
that its clergy continue to espouse rein-
carnation as a theological concept.
Assume that, well after the demise of
the donor, a new minister took to the
pulpit of the church and began to
describe reincarnation as merely a
metaphor for the fact that each day is a
new day, wherein we can be new and
better people. People of common sense
might be able to formulate a reasonable
opinion about whether the new minis-
ter's theology is consistent with the
intentions of the donor, but courts
understandably are wary of the entan-
glement that might arise from making
these kinds of determinations in a
legally binding way. Thus, in Presby-
terian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Church, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the doctrine of
implied trust could not be applied in a
manner consistent with the First
Amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion.6 As the Court noted in Hull, the
"departure-from-doctrine element" of
the theory "requires the civil court to
determine matters at the very core of a
religion - the interpretation of particu-
lar church doctrines and the importance
of those doctrines to the religion."
"Plainly," it went on to say, "the First
Amendment forbids civil courts from
playing such a role." 7 Ironically, this
rationale would appear to apply just as
forcefully to express trusts in favor of
religious uses as to implied ones.
As of today, there are two approaches
to resolving ecclesiastical disputes that
have been held to comport with the First
Amendment. The one with the longer
historical pedigree is the so-called "rule
of deference," which actually arose
from a dispute here in Kentucky. The
other is the so-called "rule of neutral
principles." As we will see, the courts of
the Commonwealth have not defini-
tively embraced either of these rules to
the exclusion of the other.
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The Rule of Deference
The rule of deference is uniquely
suited to a hierarchical church,
although it has some application to a
congregational polity as well. Under
this rule, courts avoid enmeshing them-
selves in theological disputes by
deferring to the highest authority
within a particular religious structure
as that structure presents itself to the
civil world. As the Supreme Court of
the United States explained in Watson
v. Jones, the case in which it first
applied the doctrine, when a dispute
within a denomination has "been
decided by the highest of [the ecclesi-
astical] judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final,
and as binding on them, in their appli-
cation to the case before them."
8
Watson v. Jones arose from a dispute
within the Third or Walnut Street Pres-
byterian Church in Louisville in the
aftermath of the Civil War. During the
war, the church's national body, the
General Assembly, had supported the
Union and opposed slavery.9 In the bit-
ter ecclesiastical disputes that followed
the war, it became apparent that a
majority of the congregation had also
opposed slavery. A majority of the local
Session, however, had defended slavery,
the Session being the primary governing
body of the local institution.10 A dispute
thus ensued as to whether the majority
of the Session or a majority of the con-
gregation, which itself aligned with the
General Assembly, were the "true" rep-
resentatives of the local church. The
case originated in federal court on
account of diversity, some of the con-
gregants being from Indiana.I The
Court, adhering at that time to the doc-
trine of Swift v. Tyson, 12 which
permitted it to create federal common
law, applied the rule of deference to
resolve the case.
This rule has the obvious virtues of
upholding the prerogatives of religious
tribunals, of preserving lines of author-
ity set up by a religious society, and of
protecting civil courts from the potential
hazards of resolving theological dis-
putes. As two prominent commentators
noted in a general article on the subject,
the approach of Watson v. Jones "posed
few difficulties":
Once civil courts found
implied consent on the part of a
local church to be bound to a
general church organization, the
crucial determination then
became the characterization of
the church polity as either congre-
gational or hierarchical. When a
church's organizational structure
was ascertained to be hierarchi-
cal, the action or judgment of the
highest church tribunal was con-
clusive on the civil court.
13
On the other hand, the rule of defer-
ence obviously prefers hierarchy and
order to the wishes of dissenting mem-
bers of such a society, who of course
can be many in number, and who may
have been much more responsible for
building the local institution than the
larger church. As noted above, however,
there are rights on both sides of such
disputes.
Announcing
The New Aon Attorneys' Advantage Professional Liability Program
Aon Attorneys' Advantage has been able to establish an exclusive vlatonship wilh Monitor Liability Manager
and Carolina Casualty Insurance Company. We offer:
* Coverage rated "A" (Excellent) by A. M. Best Company. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company is part of the W.R.
Berkley Company, a Fortune 500 company with assets in excess of $9 billion.
• Career Coverage or Full Prior Acts available to qualifying firms.
,'. Free ERP for death, disability or retirement to attorneys who have been insured with Aon Affomy'1Adwv* for
three consecutive years. Available limits may vary.
6"eed reporting period options of 12, 24, 36, 60 months with an unlimited option available by endorsement to
qual~ing firms.
10 AlsoAvailable to qualifying firms:
/ Loss Only Deductible /Title Agents and Tle Agency Coverage
"- ,/Aggregate Deductible /Public Official Coverage
Roi . Fihr-. nAfnt Inu rneS vi sIc
220~~ Wes Mai Stet :ut e10eoivilK 00
I It E-nfrm ti t -, S -Gj r1 §
This announcement 9 for illutrative purposes only. Specific coverage, limits and provisions are subiect to the terms of the kIsurance policies as issued./ 9AOAH005
July 2008 Bench & Bar 29
AAjL----o44ON
The Rule of Neutral Principles
The other constitutional option is for
courts to resort to so-called "neutral prin-
ciples of law." Under this approach,
courts apply the same principles of law to
a dispute arising from a denominational
schism as they would to a dispute arising
from the fragmentation of a non-religious
voluntary association. The Supreme
Court of the United States give its first
fulsome approval to this approach in
Jones v. Wolf, another case involving the
Presbyterian Church.' 4 In this case, the
Supreme Court of Georgia had held in
favor of the local congregation, applying
neutral principles, and the Court upheld
its decision to do so. Although the Court
did not describe neutral principles as
mandated by the First Amendment, it
nevertheless saw them as permissible,
and perhaps even preferred.
15
An obvious advantage of applying
neutral principles is that it saves courts
from having to choose between an
ecclesiastical hierarchy (if there is one)
and a dissenting congregation, unless
the denomination has ordered its affairs
in accordance with civil law to require
preference of one over the other. As the
Court maintained in Jones v. Wolf, the
rule of neutral principles is both "secu-
lar" and "flexible" in its operation.
"Through appropriate reversionary
clauses and trust provisions," wrote Jus-
tice Blackmun in his opinion for the
majority, "religious societies can specify
what is to happen to church property in
the event of a particular contingency, or
what religious body will determine the
ownership in the event of a schism or
doctrinal controversy."']
6
This approach is also not without its
detractions, however. First, by emphasiz-
ing lawyerly examination of a church's
papers and records, the rule of neutral
principles will inevitably compel reli-
gious organizations to become lawyerly
in conducting their affairs. This can be a
source of difficulty. Although many reli-
gious organizations are well-endowed
with attorneys or funds with which to
engage attorneys, others are not. Second,
and as a related matter, ecclesiastical
documents are not necessarily written
with an eye toward civil litigation, nor
perhaps should they be. When this
occurs, courts will lack "neutral" lan-
guage upon which to rely.17 Finally, as
applied to grants executed in the past,
strict adherence to neutral principles will
not properly discern the original intent
of the grantor if that individual simply
assumed that his or her donation would
remain with the larger ecclesiastical
body. Nevertheless, the rule of neutral
principles is consistent with familiar
notions of private ordering. That is, if
someone wants a donation to a local
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church in fact to adhere to the larger
hierarchy, he or she can say so in the
instrument of trust or conveyance.
Civil Resolution of Ecclesiastical
Disputes in Kentucky
Over the last seventy years, Kentucky
has seen both "deference" and "neutral
principles" applied in its courts, often in
the same case. 8 In Clay v. Crawford, for
example, the Commonwealth's highest
Court held in favor of the faction of a
local church in the African Methodist
Episcopal tradition that had remained
loyal to the larger church, which took the
form of an Annual Conference under the
direction of a Bishop and a General Con-
ference.1 9 To a substantial extent, the
Court justified its decision in terms of
deference, citing Watson v. Jones. "In an
adjudication of rights," the Court wrote,
"the criterion is identity, not of individu-
als, but of organization. The question is
which of the rival factions is the true rep-
resentative and successor or continuation
of that local society as it existed prior to
the division. The answer is to be found
by ascertaining which of them adheres to
or is sanctioned by the governing or cen-
tral body."20 But the Court went on to
examine the various instruments by
which the church had acquired its prop-
erty, concluding that the grants were
subject to a trust in favor of the larger
church.2 1 In doing this, the Court's analy-
sis sounded in neutral principles.
22
In Pelphry v. Cochran, by contrast, the
Court appeared to adopt a pure version
of the rule of deference. 23 This case
involved a doctrinal schism within a
church in the Baptist tradition, which
generally contemplates a congregational
polity. The majority of the congregation
and the association with which the
majority sought to affiliate adhered to
one belief regarding the eligibility of
people who have been divorced and
remarried to become members, and the
minority adhered to another.24 Pretermit-
ting the issue of the church's exact polity,
the Court adopted a position that sounds
in deference, noting with approval that
"the trial court merely recognized as
church doctrine that which had been so
declared by the church authorities vested
with the power to declare it - either the
association if the church was a part of its
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hierarchy or a majority of the congrega-
tion if it was not." 25 The Court did not
appear to rely on any evidence that
would sound in neutral principles, stating
only that "[t]he property in question was
conveyed to the church in 1925."26
Against this backdrop, the highest
Court of Kentucky's most recent deci-
sions in this area, Bjorkman v. Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States of
America and Cumberland Presbytery of
the Synod of the Mid-West of the Cum-
berland Presbyterian Church v.
Branstetter, can be discussed.27 To one
degree or another, both Bjorkman and
Branstetter involved a blend of defer-
ence and neutral principles.
Bjorkman involved a schism within the
Episcopal denomination. Specifically, an
entire church within that denomination,
without dissent, sought to dissociate itself
from the larger structure, and litigation
ensued as to whether the larger church or
the local institution lay proper claim to
the bricks and mortar.28 This was a case
where neutral principles and deference
might well have yielded different results.
The Episcopalian Church has a hierarchi-
cal polity, with judicatory powers lying in
its senior officials. On the other hand, the
instruments by which a church takes and
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in the local institution.
Citing Jones v. Wolf, the Court applied
neutral principles and held in favor of the
local church. "[T]his nation's highest
Court," noted then-Justice Lambert for
the majority, "has held this approach to
be constitutional, preferable, and broadly
applicable as a method of resolving
church property disputes." Therefore, he
continued, "this Court is clearly empow-
ered to adopt the neutral-principles
approach if we so choose." On the other
hand, the Court noted, the justices were
"reluctant . . . to overrule longstanding
precedent." 29 The Court found an appar-
ent escape from this dilemma, however,
in the fact that none of its precedents had
involved a local church that, without dis-
sent, had sought to dissociate from a
denominational hierarchy.30 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court noted the
harshness and rigidity of the rule of def-
erence, at least from the point of view of
a dissenting local faction. Although the
Court acknowledged that neutral princi-
ples might not be a "panacea," it
nevertheless saw it as preferable to defer-
ence because, under the latter, "in every
case, regardless of the facts, compulsory
deference would result in the triumph of
the hierarchical organization." 3' It then
proceeded to examine the documents at
issue in the case, concluding that, as a
matter of neutral principles, the bricks
and mortar lay in the local church.
32
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The Court's observation in Bjorkman
that deference (almost) invariably yields
a victory to the ecclesiastical hierarchy is
not only true, but essentially a restate-
ment of the rule itself. That is, the rule
by definition gives almost categorical
preference to the decision of the church's
highest judicatory body. But this had
been no less true when Clay v. Crawford
and Pelphry v. Cochran were decided
than when Bjorkman was decided. For
the Court, however, the salient difference
between the earlier cases and present
case lay in the fact that in Bjorkman the
free exercise of the entire local congrega-
tion was at stake. Although this was true,
the Court's analysis is still vulnerable to
the modest criticism that it failed to take
every actor's rights into account. That is,
although there were no dissenting mem-
bers of the local church whose free
exercise would suffer were the building
to follow the schismatics, the officials of
the diocese, other worshipers of the dio-
cese, and the local church's prior donors
might also have had legitimate interests,
sounding in free exercise or in rights of
property, to have the local institution
remain in the hierarchical fold. In other
words, to distinguish a schism involving
an entire congregation from one involv-
ing a mere faction puts strong and
perhaps too much emphasis on the rights
of the current local congregation.
33
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of the Mid- West of the Cumberland Pres-
byterian Church v. Branstetter involved a
schism within a local church in the Pres-
byterian tradition, with the minority of
the congregation adhering to the larger
church and the majority seeking to break
away. 34 In the course of describing the
facts, the Court, per Justice Spain, was
careful to emphasize the "connectional or
hierarchical" nature of the Presbyterian
polity, as well as the various steps that
judicatory bodies higher than the local
church had taken. 35 It then went into a
lengthy discussion of Watson v. Jones,
which had also involved the Presbyterian
Church, noting the rule from that case
and quoting from it quite substantially.
Next, it took up Clay v. Crawford, which
it described as "a scholarly opinion" and
"[o]ne of the leading Kentucky cases
applying the compulsory deference
rule." 36 In light of this predicate, the
Court had little difficultly holding in
favor of the minority of the local institu-
tion that had remained faithful to the
larger ecclesiastical hierarchy. "Applica-
tion of the 'compulsory deference rule' to
the . . . dispute before us," wrote Justice
Spain, "leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that the minority faction[,] which
'adheres to' and 'is sanctioned by' the
central body, . . .must prevail.,,
37
At this point, the Court took up neu-
tral principles, discussing Jones v. Wolf
and the demise of the doctrine of
implied trust that had given rise to that
approach. After a brief review of that
case, the Branstetter Court noted that
neutral principles does not yield a "fore-
ordained" result (presumably in favor of
a majority of the local congregation),
38
but instead requires analysis of those
principles, as they exist in the jurisdic-
tion, as well as analysis of the
documents in question. The Court then
went on to observe that the larger church
in the case before it had amended its
Constitution in 1984, before the dispute
had arisen, to provide that "all property
held by or for a particular church . . . is
held in trust nevertheless for the use and
benefit of the [general church] .,,39 In
other words, wrote Justice Spain, the
general church had amended its organic
document in response to Jones v. Wolf.
The Court then proceeded to distinguish
Bjorkman, noting first that the earlier
case had involved a unanimous local
congregation seeking to break away, and
second that Bjorkman had not involved a
denomination that had revised its
organic documents to make the results
under deference and neutral principles
the same.n°
As the foregoing discussion suggests,
much of the analysis in Branstetter
sounded in the rule of deference, with
substantial positive references to both
Watson v. Jones and Clay v. Crawford.
Nevertheless, the Court did not overrule
Bjorkman, instead distinguishing it as a
case involving a unanimous local depar-
ture. In addition, the Court was careful
in Branstetter to emphasize that both
neutral principles and deference would
yield a decision in favor of the hierar-
chy in that case. Thus, Branstetter does
not appear to stand firmly for either
rule, and further litigation may be nec-
essary to establish whether neutral
principles will govern in all such cases
in Kentucky, or only where the facts of
Bjorkman arise again. U
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